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Simply as an account of military events however the volume leaves something to be desired. Rather too much space is given to details, and not quite enough to fundamental questions of topography, tactics, and strategy. There are a number of excellent summaries of events and expositions of situations and discussions of objects and criticisms of strategy; but not infrequently the attention is distracted from fundamentals by the information that "the Germans encircling Ciechanow found themselves encircled at Prasnysz", or that "a battery of Royal Horse Artillery was almost wiped out". The campaigns in Germany's African possessions are given a disproportionate amount of space. Judicious condensation would have made it possible to amplify the discussion of the original French-British plans, the numbers and advantages of the opposing forces, the theories of war of the various general staffs, the developments in tactics evolved by either side, and the like. The accounts of the war by such writers as Belloc and Simonds may perhaps be criticized by military experts, but they have the merit of making clear the general principles and primary objectives, and the average reader, in spite of his newspaper education during the war, needs this kind of information.

In spite however of what the book does not contain—and one cannot say everything in four hundred pages—the volume is well worth reading. Its tone is temperate and judicial, though there is an undercurrent of criticism of the Lloyd George coalition government. Except for the paragraphs in which one gets lost in a tangle of place-names, the account of events is clear and interesting.

ARTHUR P. SCOTT.

*The Victory at Sea.* By Rear-Admiral WILLIAM SOWDEN SIMS, U. S. N., Commander of the American Naval Forces operating in European Waters during the Great War, in collaboration with Burton J. Hendrick. (Garden City and New York: Doubleday, Page, and Company. 1920. Pp. xiii, 410. \$5.00.)

THIS is a very interesting book carrying with it a comprehensive and intelligent description of the submarine and anti-submarine warfare of the late war, and is by far the best yet made known to the world.

It is especially in this respect of great historical and professional value, as it treats in a continuously progressive manner, technically correct, as well as illuminating, of the wonderful development of the campaign against the submarine, in the great trade routes and waters, converging about the British Isles. It states clearly the successive steps taken to avoid and counteract the German submarine warfare which at one time seemed to be on the point of success.

The concentration of shipping and transport in the narrow seas about Great Britain and Ireland afforded the salient objective for the sub-

marine of the Germans. The importance of this objective grew with the increased necessity for food and munition supply, for raw materials, for manufacture of supplies essential to the success of the war, and above all in latter days, for the safe transport of men and material from the United States both before and after our country had entered fully into the Great War.

It was fortunate for us that we had an officer of high rank, and especial experience, like Admiral Sims, available for the duty for which he was detailed practically as the head of naval affairs of this country in London, the natural centre of naval operations in European waters. Of untiring energy, his personality and accomplishments were well known to the British Admiralty circles, and as a *persona grata* he had little difficulty in establishing relations and co-ordinating his efforts with those of the British naval officials toward the common end.

After establishing himself in London and taking over the duties of naval attaché to our embassy, he directed his efforts to securing from home the necessary vessels for the anti-submarine war. The first squadron of destroyers under Taussig soon arrived at Queenstown and the others of all classes followed at varying intervals. As they came they were distributed to the various bases in the British Isles under the British commanders-in-chief, thus preventing divided effort and loss of power. In the meantime American officers of high rank had been placed in command of various bases on the French Atlantic coast, at Gibraltar, and elsewhere in the Mediterranean. There was also a division of battle-ships under Admiral Slidell Rodgers of the convoying force which with the convoying forces in general on the European side was under Sims's directions.

Sims was however a naval administrator in his duties and not afloat as a commander-in-chief or as a fighter. Practically he was chief of operations as well as commander of the American naval forces operating in European waters. Rodman's squadron became a unit of the Grand Fleet under Admiral Beatty, though the internal matters still vested with Rodman. The position of a naval officer in a fighting command is very well differentiated from that of general by Lord Fisher when he says, "The general is somewhere behind the fighting line or ought to be. The admiral has got to be *in* the fighting line or he ought to be." Though Sims did not get afloat or in the fighting line, he served his country at his post, with remarkable fidelity and efficiency.

In his dispatch to the Navy Department dated June 19, 1917, Sims says, "As reported by cable dispatch, the British government has definitely reached the decision to put the convoy system into operation as far as it goes. . . . The British Navy is already strained beyond its capacity, and I therefore urgently recommend that we co-operate, at least to the extent of handling convoys from New York." We did co-

operate and with eminent success. This seems to be the beginning of the convoy system.

The personal narrative of Admiral Sims, his personal touch, as it were, as it occurs in various parts of the book, is spirited and interesting, but the most valuable and historical part of the volume before us is the history and description of the methods of attack by the German submarines and the various measures taken in the counter-attack and overcoming of these operations. These measures, stated more or less progressively, were, the arming of the merchantmen, zigzagging in the courses followed, the patrolling of the destroyers, the use of depth-bombs, the formation of convoys, the employment of mystery ships, which were disguised merchantmen, the use of the subchasers, and later and more successfully the employment of the allied submarines, aeroplanes, and hydroplanes.

Apparently the progress of the war developed ultimately that the most deadly enemy of the German submarine was the submarine itself. Absolutely the destroyers scored more heavily because they outnumbered any other craft, but relatively the submarine proved more successful. Of the vessels engaged, the allied destroyers, about 500 in number, sank 34 German submarines with gun-fire and depth-charges, though auxiliary patrol craft, such as trawlers, yachts, subchasers, and other light craft, numbering about 3000, sank 31 submarines; while the allied submarines, about 100 in number, sank 20 submarines.

The most striking story of the book is that of the mystery ship *Dunraven* under the command of Captain Gordon Campbell of the British Navy. The last fight and the last days of the *Dunraven* and the heroism exhibited by her commander and her crew are I believe unequalled anywhere in naval warfare. It reflects the greatest credit, not only upon those immediately concerned, but also upon the British naval service as well as the nation of which it is a part.

But the history of this submarine campaign, largely carried on by the young men of both services, British and American, of enlisted and commissioned rank, should be a cause of great pride and satisfaction to their respective countrymen and make them realize that the sea-instinct of the race only needs opportunity to show that it is as splendid as ever, exhibited as well whether they fight separately or unitedly as natural allies afloat.

*Some Problems of the Peace Conference.* By CHARLES HOMER HASKINS and ROBERT HOWARD LORD. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1920. Pp. xii, 307. \$3.00.)

IN this volume the authors present in print the lectures delivered by them at the Lowell Institute in January, 1920, on the territorial settlement of Europe determined by the Peace Conference. Professor Has-